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Polycentrism is a common feature of European urban systems. Lately, the concept has assumed a 
more normative relevance and it has been often considered as a pre‐requisite for a more sustainable 
and balanced development across Europe. However, the effects of polycentrism on other main 
European Strategies (such as the Lisbon Strategy, aimed at increasing European competitiveness 
and social cohesion) are not so clear. Therefore, the paper tries to highlight the relationships 
between a regional polycentric development and the achievement of the Lisbon Strategy’s targets. 
Referring to a sample of 75 regions belonging to France, Germany, Italy and Spain, we have first 
measured the extent of polycentrism, by estimating through OLS the slope of the rank-size 
distribution of cities within each region. Then, we have performed a principal component analysis 
(PCA) in order to highlight the main features characterising the performance of each region 
according to Lisbon Strategy’s targets. Looking at the correlations between the extent of 
polycentrism and the achievement of the Lisbon Strategy’s targets, we have found that the former is 
significantly correlated both with the spread of manufacture and with low investments in human 
capital and innovation. 
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1  Introduction 
Since the early days of the European Union (EU), several EU policies have been targeted to 
regional dimension. However, the regional perspective has gained more importance within the 
recent evolution of EU policies. In the last decade, several documents have been discussed and 
approved in order to strengthen the regional and territorial dimension of EU policies (CSD, 1999; 
European Union, 2007; Barca, 2009). 
The EU’s regional policy, that today holds second place as a share of EU total expenditures after the 
CAP, aims to reduce the economic disparities among EU regions, furthering social cohesion in the 
process of EU integration (Neal, 2007). In particular, regions are recognized as the most important 
territorial level of intervention, especially for policies which have to promote a greater coherence 
within the EU. 
Within this policy framework, all EU territorial documents have stressed the relevance of 
polycentrism as a tool of territorial intervention. Since the middle ‘90s, the concept of polycentric 
development has not only been considered a simple theoretical tool in the analysis of the spatial 
organisation of metropolitan regions (as in Ostrom et al., 1961). Instead, it has assumed a more 
normative relevance (Davoudi, 2003; Faludi, 2006): nowadays, polycentric development is 
acknowledged to be a main pre‐requisite for a more sustainable and balanced development (CSD, 
1999) and the concept has been transformed into a key policy goal. In particular, the economic 
integration of areas outside the so-called “Pentagon” (i.e. the area marked by its corners London–
Paris–Milan–Munich–Hamburg) is crucial for assure greater competitiveness to EU (Faludi, 2006).  
By the way, the strong attention to regional issues (and, in particular, to the polycentric 
development of EU territories) seems to be not fully acknowledged by another strategic policy of 
the EU, i.e. the Lisbon Strategy (now Europe 2020 Strategy). This policy should orient relevant EU 
interventions (e.g., the improvements in employment rates, in social inclusion and in economic 
competitiveness), promoting the growth of the EU Member States
1. However, a persistent bias is 
observed: Lisbon Strategy mainly applies at EU and national level, thus totally ignoring the regional 
dimension (that is acknowledged to be more important in promoting territorial cohesion). 
In particular, the paper focuses on regional performances according to the Lisbon Strategy, trying to 
highlight relationship between a regional polycentric development and the achievement of the 
targets of the Strategy. Therefore, we first measure the extent of polycentrism within EU regions, 
focusing our attention on four major EU countries: France, Germany, Italy and Spain. The analysis 
is performed on NUTS 2 regions, with the only exception of Germany, where NUTS 1 regions have 
been chosen. The extent of polycentrism is estimated by adopting a morphological perspective, i.e. 
by estimating through OLS the slope of the rank-size distribution of cities within each region. Then, 
we perform a multivariate statistical analysis (principal component analysis or PCA) in order to 
detect the main features characterising regional performances according to the Lisbon Strategy’s 
                                                            
1. The Lisbon Strategy was launched in 2000: its main aim was to make the EU “the most competitive and dynamic 
knowledge-based economy in the world capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater 
social cohesion” by 2010 (European Council, 2000). In 2010, Europe 2020 Strategy replaced Lisbon Strategy. 3 
 
targets. Finally, we highlight main correlations between the extent of polycentrism and the 
achievement of these targets. 
The work is organised as follows. Section 2 sums up the theoretical background about the 
development of the concept of polycentrism within main EU documents. Some insights on Lisbon 
Strategy and Europe 2020 Strategy are also provided. Section 3 is a methodological section: both 
rank-size distribution methodology and PCA are shown and explained. Section 4 provides main 
results about the extent of polycentrism at regional level and about regional performances according 
to the Lisbon Strategy’s targets. Section 5 highlights main correlations between polycentrism and 
the achievement of these targets. Section 6 concludes the work.  
 
2  Theoretical background 
Since the middle of XX century, the concept of polycentricism has been adopted as a theoretical 
tool in order to analyze the contemporary spatial organisation of metropolitan regions (Ostrom et 
al., 1961). In the ‘90s, the concept also assumed a more normative relevance (Davoudi, 2003; 
Faludi, 2006). Since the presentation of the “European Spatial Development Perspective” (ESDP) in 
1999 (CSD, 1999) and the approval of the “Territorial Agenda of the European Union” (European 
Union, 2007), a set of normative tools has been applied in order to achieve crucial EU policy 
objectives. Recommendations are oriented to a more polycentric urban development, 
counterbalancing the central role of the so-called “Pentagon” (i.e. the area marked by its corners 
London–Paris–Milan–Munich–Hamburg) and involving explicit urban-rural partnerships (Guérois 
et al., 2002). In particular, polycentric development is seen as a main pre‐requisite for a more 
sustainable and balanced development (CSD, 1999) and also as a key policy goal. In 2009, the 
report “An Agenda for a Reformed Cohesion Policy” (Barca, 2009) acknowledged the role of 
networked polycentric regions as a way both to promote balanced territorial development and to 
overcome the disadvantages arising from big urban agglomerations. However, in comparison to the 
US, large urban agglomerations are not a typical feature of the European urban system (Le Galès, 
2006; Vicari Haddock, 2004)
2. Moreover, in Europe, agglomeration economies are often generated 
either by strong relationships between major cities and their hinterland or by “dense networks of big 
or middle sized cities” (Barca, 2009 – p. 18). 
In spite of these key ideas, definitions about polycentrism are “vague” (Riguelle et al., 2007 – p. 
195). The concept is a typical multiscalar and multidimensional one (i.e., a region which is 
polycentric at a given spatial scale may be monocentric at a smaller one). By the way, there is a 
general consensus among scholars about main features of polycentrism. In polycentric regions, 
cities are located in close proximity to each other but they maintain their historical distinctions; they 
lack a leading city and they constitute independent political entities (Kloosterman et al., 2001). At 
the same time, they are well-connected (Meijers, 2008) and interrelated through co-operation flows 
(Cowell, 2010). Therefore, when dealing with polycentrism, both morphological perspective and 
                                                            
2. In the US, urban agglomerations are bigger and cities are less connected to each other than in EU. 4 
 
functional one have to be considered (Nordregio et al., 2004; Veneri et al., 2010): the former 
focuses on the distribution of cities and on their dimensions (Lambooy, 1998; Parr, 2004; Meijers, 
2008); the latter focuses on the interactions among urban centres, by analyzing flows of people, 
goods or information (Van der Laan, 1998; Hall et al., 2006; Limtanakool et al., 2007). 
It is important to point out that polycentrism has not only been used as a tool to describe specific 
ways of territorial organization. Indeed, according to the main EU territorial documents, polycentric 
development now represents a strategic tool which can promote economic competitiveness (Hague 
et al., 2003), social cohesion (Meijers et al., 2008) and environmental sustainability (CSD, 1999). 
However, several concerns about polycentric development arise. First, the positive effects of 
polycentrism often lack a theoretical rationale (Meijers, 2008; Veneri et al., 2010). Moreover, these 
effects have not been sufficiently investigated through empirical analysis (Meijers, 2008). Then, a 
more theoretical issue is represented by the coherence of policies enhancing a polycentric 
development across EU with the other EU policies and in particular with the Lisbon Strategy. 
Although the EU Ministers responsible for spatial planning and development have declared their 
support to the Lisbon Strategy (European Union, 2007), the effects of a more polycentric 
development on the targets of this Strategy are not so straightforward.  
In particular, the Lisbon Strategy rests on three pillars (European Council, 2000): i) an economic 
pillar, devoted to the preparation of the ground for the transition to a more competitive, dynamic 
and knowledge-based economy; ii) a social pillar with the aim of modernising the European social 
model through more investments in education and training and through the promotion of the 
employment; iii) an environmental pillar (which was added at the Göteborg European Council in 
June 2001), that draws greater attention to the impact of the economic growth on the use of natural 
resources
3. 
In terms of possible links to polycentrism, the Lisbon Strategy seems to be affected by several 
biases. At present, the strategy does not take into account the deep differences existing amongst the 
27 EU Member States. Nordic Countries, Mediterranean ones and Eastern ones sharply differ from 
each other. For example, according to the equity and the efficiency of their economy, Sapir (2006) 
has already highlighted the existence of four different European social models among EU 
countries
4. Deep differences also exist within the EU Member Countries, especially within those of 
greater dimension. Nevertheless, Lisbon Strategy seems not to give importance to these regional 
patterns, ignoring the increasing attention paid to the regional dimension by EU territorial policies.  
 
3  Methodology and data 
As the aim of this work is twofold (i.e., trying to measure the extent of polycentrism within EU 
regions and to observe existing links with the achievement of Lisbon Strategy’s targets), different 
                                                            
3. The new Europe 2020 Strategy represents a much more effective reform programme, which is based on a smart, 
inclusive and sustainable growth (European Commission, 2010).  
4. In Sapir (2006), just Western EU countries were considered. In a previous work, Bertolini and Pagliacci (2011) 
extended the analysis of Sapir also to EU Eastern Member Countries.  5 
 
statistical methodologies are applied in the paper. Before describing them (in section 3.2 and 3.3), 
we move from the description of the sample of considered regions.  
 
3.1  The sample of regions 
Our sample includes the regions of four major EU countries: i.e., France, Germany, Italy and Spain. 
According to the EU Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS), we have considered 
different NUTS level within the four selected countries. As suggested by the ESDP (CSD, 1999), 
we have considered NUTS 2 regions for France, Italy and Spain. Therefore, we have included in the 
sample 21 Italian Regioni, 22 French Régions and 16 Spanish Comunidades Autónomas
5. Due to its 
peculiar administrative framework, we have selected German NUTS 1 regions (i.e., the 16 German 
Länder). Although corresponding to a different NUTS level, Länder are the most important 
administrative level in Germany and they are generally used in European comparative analysis. 
A further caveat must be stated. When calculating the extent of polycentrism (see Section 4.1), the 
total sample is reduced from 75 to 72 regions. In Germany, 3 Länder are Stadtstaaten (i.e., city-
states): Berlin, Hamburg and Bremen. Due to this reason, they are considered as belonging to the 
Flächenländer (i.e., area states) which contain them: Berlin is included in Brandenburg; Bremen in 
Niedersachsen; Hamburg in Schleswig-Holstein. When performing PCA (Section 4.2), the total 
sample of 75 regions is considered. 
 
3.2  Measuring the extent of regional polycentrism: the rank-size distribution 
A polycentric region is an area which is characterised by several cities which lack a clear hierarchy. 
In literature, several ways to measure the extent of polycentricy have been proposed. They focus 
both on the functional and on the morphological perspective (Nordregio et al., 2004; Veneri et al., 
2010). Due to a lack in statistical data, in the paper we mainly refer to the morphological (or 
geographical) extent of polycentrism at regional level. Following previous works on the topic 
(Nordregio et al., 2004; Meijers, 2008; Veneri et al., 2010), we choose the slope of the equation of 
the rank-size distribution of cities as the main indicator of the extent of polycentrism at the regional 
level. In particular, within each region, cities are ranked according to their population. For example, 
in Bayern, the first city is München; the second one is Nürnberg; the third is Augsburg and so on. 
Then, the following equation (1) is estimated: 
Ln (pop) = α + β Ln (rank)    (1) 
 
This is the so-called rank-size equation, as expressed in the Lotka form (Parr, 1985). This is one of 
a variety of special applications of Zipf’s Law, which was first formulated by a linguist (Zipf 1935; 
1949)
6. According to the Zipf’s Law, when drawing log-rank against log-size, a straight line is 
                                                            
5. Regions which are not located into the European continent have been excluded from the analysis. These regions are: 
i) the French Départements d’outre-mer (DOM) of Guadeloupe, Martinique, Guyane and Réunion; ii) Iles Canarias 
(Spain); iii) Ciudad Autónoma de Ceuta (Spain); iv) Ciudad Autónoma de Melilla (Spain).  
6. The original law simply states that the frequency of any word is inversely proportional to its rank in the frequency 
table: the most frequent word occur approximately twice as often as the second most frequent one, three times as often 6 
 
obtained, with a slope which is very close to -1. Several studies have confirmed that the law holds 
within big countries (e.g., India, China, the US) or areas (the EU). However, since its original 
formulations, many explanations about this empirical law have been proposed, but all pose 
considerable difficulties. Gabaix (1999) suggest that Zipf’s Law for cities follows the same 
analytical framework proposed by Gibrat’s Law for firms’ size distribution (cities grow randomly 
with the same expected growth rate and the same variance, i.e. the growth process of cities is 
independent of size). However, the rank-size rule is not a law (McCann, 2001) and, therefore, the 
theoretical problem about its economic explanation is still open.  
By the way, we use this empirical tool in order to establish the extent of polycentrism within each 
region. In doing so, we use the Lotka form as shown in (1), drawing on a consolidated tradition 
(Nordregio et al., 2004; Meijers, 2008; Veneri et al., 2010). In particular, we estimate the slope of 
equation (1) through OLS method. The estimations obtained for β describe the level of polycentrism 
within a given region: the higher the value, the more polycentric a region is. This result is 
straightforward. In a polycentric region, there is not a unique city which dominates over the others, 
thus the slope of the OLS regression line is generally greater than -1 (i.e., regression line is flatter). 
In contrast, monocentric regions show a slope of the OLS regression line which is smaller than -1 
(i.e., the regression line is steeper). Two examples are provided in figure 1: Emilia-Romagna (Italy) 
is a more polycentric region than Pays de la Loire (France). 
Although the adoption of this estimator as an indicator of polycentrism is straightforward, several 
issues have to be highlighted. A first concern is related to the definition of city to be used. Different 
definitions of cities are used across EU Countries. Therefore, we have chosen different units of 
analysis which allow a more homogeneous comparison of cities: we have taken Italian comuni, 
Spanish municipios, French communes or, more often, communautés d’agglomeration
7, German 
gemeinden. Data about population of Italian, Spanish and French cities refer to national Censuses 
(reference year is 2001 for both the Italian Census and the Spanish one; it is 1999 for French 
Census); whereas data about population of German cities refer to 2008. Urban systems are stable 










as the third most frequent one, and so on. The appearance of a Zipfian distribution in rankings of cities by population 
had been first noticed by Auerbach (1913). 
7. France has a wider number of communes than Italy and Spain. As a consequence, larger French cities are generally 
divided into several communes.  Communautés d’agglomeration are groups of communes which are in charge of 
managing greater urban areas. As a consequence, they are particularly suitable in order to identify urban areas. 7 
 
Figure 1: rank-size distribution for a polycentric region (left) and a monocentric one (right) 
 
Source: personal elaboration on Istat (2001) and Insee (1999) 
 
A second issue concerns the fact that estimations may be affected by the number of cities which are 
included in the OLS regression analysis. In particular, the sample size can be identified by: i) a 
fixed number of towns; ii) a fixed size threshold of inhabitants; iii) a size above which the sample 
accounts for some given proportion of regional population. Following Meijers (2008), we choose 
option i), as we are dealing with heterogeneous regions belonging to different EU Countries
8.  
The last question deals with the number of cities to be included within the OLS model. Meijers 
(2008) suggests selecting a few numbers of cities per region. According to this perspective, we 
measure the extent of polycentricism by estimating the slope of the regression line of the rank-size 
distribution based on the five, eight, ten, twelve and fifteen largest cities within each region. By the 
way, our main ‘Policentricity Index’ will be based on the estimations on the ten largest cities per 
region. Although this choice may seem arbitrary, it has been taken in order to counterbalance two 
opposite effects: the influence of national patterns on polycentrism which is observed when the 
number of cities included in the sample is greater than 12 and the influence of too local patterns, 
when such a number is reduced below 8. 
 
3.3  PCA for the analysis of regional performance according to the Lisbon Strategy 
The second analysis performed on the sample of 75 NUTS 2 and NUTS 1 regions is the analysis of 
their performances according to the Lisbon Strategy’s targets (economic competitiveness, social 
cohesion, investments in education and human capital, environmental sustainability). In order to 
sum up this performance, a list of 25 demographic, economic, structural and environmental 
                                                            
8. In such a situation, the application of a fixed size threshold is inappropriate, as in large regions a town of 10,000 
inhabitants is insignificant, whereas a similar town is of greater importance in smaller regions. Moreover, also the 
number of cities comprising a given proportion of the population may distort the analysis, due to the fact that this 
number is in itself a possible indicator of polycentrism.  





























































Pays de la Loire (FR)8 
 
variables (periodically available at regional level) has been selected. Several statistical sources have 
been used: in particular, the Regional Statistics of Eurostat (Eurostat, 2011) and the Fifth Report on 
Economic Social and Territorial Cohesion Report (European Commission, 2010b). Just data 
referring to regional accessibility (provided at NUTS 3 level) are provided by the ESPON database 
(2006). Data generally refer to years between 2005 and 2009
9; whereas regional accessibility data 
refer to year 2001. In Appendix A, the definition of the adopted variables, the statistical source and 
the reference year are provided in more detail. 
Then, we apply the methodology of principal components analysis (PCA) to the 25 variables 
already identified. PCA belongs to multivariate statistics and it helps in reducing the number of 
variables of a system while preserving the most of the information (Hotelling, 1933; Pearson, 1901). 
In particular, PCA allows us not to make strong a priori assumptions on the model. With PCA, we 
transform a group of p indicators, obtained on a group of n statistical units, into a much smaller 
group of variables which can still explain a high level of variance of the original data, thus avoiding 
an important loss of information. Moreover, whereas the original variables are highly correlated, the 
obtained indicators (i.e., principal components) are a linear combination of the original variables 
and they are uncorrelated. In particular, we compute the PCA moving from the correlation matrix, 
in order to avoid, during the extraction, the distorting influence of variables showing a higher 
variance. Having obtained the values of each component moving from the correlation matrix, we 
can then calculate the scores of each statistical unit (in our case, of each region) for each component.  
The k principal component (where k < p) comes from the following linear combinations, expressed 
as a matrix: 
Y= X A     (2) 
 
where Y is the nxk matrix, containing the scores of the n statistical units in the k components; A is 
the vector matrix pxk of the normalized coefficients; X is the nxp matrix of the standardized data. 
In order to simplify the interpretation of factor loadings, principal components are orthogonally 
rotated (thus maintaining uncorrelation among the factors) with VARIMAX. After the rotation, the 
total variance explained by the components is reduced. 
 
4  Main results 
4.1  Applying rank-size distribution to the European regions 
For the 72 regions composing the sample, the extent of polycentrism is calculated by estimating the 
coefficient β of the rank-size distribution in (1) through OLS method. In particular, we run several 
OLS regressions respectively on the five, eight, ten, twelve and fifteen largest cities per region. 
Estimations for β change when moving from 5 to 15 cities. In particular, when just considering the 
five largest cities per region (i.e., when just considering the upper tail of the rank-size distribution), 
the 72 regions show an average estimation for  which is equal to -1.2288 and a standard deviation 
                                                            
9. More in general, the impact of the current economic international crisis has been voluntarily neglected. 9 
 
of 0.5167. When increasing the number of cities per region chosen, the average slope of the OLS 
regression line moves toward -1, according to the main results observed in literature. In particular, 
when estimating the regression line on the fifteen largest cities per region, the average slope is -
1.0683 and the standard deviation strongly decreases (0.2562). Table 1 shows the main descriptive 
statistics for the estimated coefficients. In Appendix A, all the coefficients that have been estimated 
for the 72 regions are shown. 
By the way, also the distribution of the estimated coefficients is a relevant feature. When estimating 
 on the basis of few cities per regions, scores are not normally distributed; when increasing the 
number of cities, scores of  appear more and more normally distributed (figure 2). 
 
Table 1 – Main descriptive statistics for  coefficients of the rank-size equation (OLS estimations) 
5 Cities  8 Cities  10Ccities  12 Cities  15 Cities 
Min  -3.510 -2.454 -2.096 -1.908 -1.726 
Mean  -1.229 -1.136 -1.106 -1.086 -1.068 
Max  -0.386 -0.495 -0.486 -0.505 -0.548 
SD  0.5167 0.3578 0.3070 0.2786 0.2562 
No. observations  72 72 72 72 72 
Source: personal elaboration on Insee (1999), Istat (2001), Ine (2001), Destatis (2008) 
 
Figure 2 – Distribution of  coefficients of the rank-size equation estimated through OLS 
 
Source: personal elaboration on Insee (1999), Istat (2001), Ine (2001), Destatis (2008) 
Moreover, in figure 3, the extent of mono-/ polycentrism within the 72 regions when changing the 
number of largest cities included in the analysis is shown.  
 















































































































Figure 3 – Regions and their extent of mono-/ polycentrism, estimated for samples of five (a), eight 
(b), ten (c), twelve (d) and fifteen (e) largest cities per region 
 
Source: personal elaboration on Insee (1999), Istat (2001), Ine  (2001), Destatis (2008) 
 
From figure 3 it is clear that, when changing the number of cities included in the OLS model, the 
extent of polycentrism within a given region deeply changes. In particular, when considering just 
the five largest cities within each region, the extent of mono-/ polycentrism seems to be deeply 
affected by local characteristics, i.e. by the peculiar distribution of the biggest cities in a given 
region. As a consequence, extreme values in the estimated scores are quite common. On the 11 
 
opposite side, when considering a greater number of cities per region (e.g., the fifteen largest cities) 
different national patterns tend to emerge. In particular, these national patterns also affect regional 
estimations: as a consequence, most of Italian and German regions are quite polycentric, whereas 
French regions are generally monocentric.  
As a consequence, in order to counterbalance these opposite effects (i.e., results too much affected 
by either local or national patterns), we refer to the estimations of the slope of the rank-size 
distribution considering the ten largest cities per region as the ‘Policentricity Index’. Other 
estimations will be used in order to check for robustness. 
Therefore, when considering the 10 largest cities per regions (recall figure 4.c), the following main 
features emerge. In France, the most monocentric region is Île de France ( = -2.096). Other 
monocentric regions are Alsace, Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur and Limousin. On the opposite side, 
only Poitou-Charente, Picardie and Bourgogne are considered polycentric regions, showing scores 
for which are greater than -1.  
German regions are generally much more polycentric than French ones: Nordrhein-Westfalen and 
Rheinland-Pfalz are the two most polycentric German regions ( = -0.520 and  = -0.649, 
respectively). This two Länder are located along the River Rhein including the Ruhr, i.e. one of the 
most polycentric areas across Europe (Romein, 2004). Brandenburg and Schleswig-Holstein, on the 
contrary, are monocentric Länder. These results are mainly due to the presence of the two biggest 
German cities, i.e. Berlin and Hamburg.  
In Italy, the most polycentric region is Marche: showing a value for  which is equal to -0.486, 
Marche is the most polycentric region in the whole sample, when considering the 10 largest cities 
per region. However, also other regions belonging to the so-called Third Italy (Bagnasco, 1977; 
1988) show typical polycentric features: this is the case of Emilia-Romagna, Toscana, Abruzzo. On 
the opposite side, Lazio, Liguria and Friuli Venezia Giulia are monocentric regions.  
Referring to Spain, Castilla-La Mancha is the Spanish most polycentric region. More in general, the 
Southern and Western regions (such as Andalucia, Castilla-y-Leon and Extremadura) are more 
polycentric than the North-Eastern regions (e.g., Aragona, Asturias and La Rioja). 
 
4.2  Applying PCA to the European regions 
Working on a dataset of 25 economic, demographic and social variables (see Appendix A), we are 
able to identify the main features of the regional performance according to the targets of the Lisbon 
Strategy. The identification of the variables is a critical issue: according to available data, we have 
selected a list of indicators which is able both to catch the most relevant features of European 
regions and to show their performance according to the Strategy’s main targets.  
After having applied PCA to this dataset, KMO test is performed. The test is a measure of sampling 
adequacy, testing whether the partial correlations among variables are small. In our case, a value of 
0.7633 is considered good. Then, different methods can be used to establish the right number of 
principal components (PCs) to be chosen: i) the Guttman-Kaiser criterion (i.e., taking the 
components able to explain at least the 70-80% of cumulative variance); ii) the choice of the 12 
 
principal components with eigenvalue over 1; iii) the empirical analysis of the elbow on the scree 
plot. Combining all these methods, we select 6 components, representing 81.9% of the original 
variance. Then principal components are orthogonally rotated with VARIMAX: after the rotation, 
the total variance explained by the components reduces to 76.5%. In table 2, all the factor loadings 
(with the only exception of those which are smaller than 0.2) are shown.  
 
Table 2 – Factor loadings for the 6 PCs (after VARIMAX rotation) 
Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 Factor5 Factor6 
Resident Population  0.716
GDP per capita  0.481 -0.568 0.247
GVA of agriculture   -0.636 0.225 
GVA of manufacture   0.213 0.236 0.909
Employment in agriculture   -0.643 0.246 -0.287 0.258 
Employment in manufacture    -0.325 0.904
Total employment rate  -0.528 0.765
Total employment rate (55-64 y)  0.381 0.659
Female employment rate  -0.430 0.759 -0.346 0.240
Unemployment rate    0.896 0.266 -0.225
Long-term unemployment rate  0.892 -0.283 
Unemployment rate (15-24 y)  -0.252 0.560 -0.520 0.397 -0.232
Population with low education  -0.386 -0.527 0.700 
Population with tertiary education    -0.227 0.920
Early school leavers  0.963 
R&D expenditures  0.561 -0.271  0.426
Patents per million inhabitants 0.687 0.247 -0.297  0.209
Household with broadband connection  0.496 0.501 0.405
Population at risk-of-poverty (after social transfers)  0.794 -0.300 0.284 
Concentration of PM10  0.666 0.205 0.203
Land for artificial uses (% on total)  0.599
Passenger cars per 1000 inhabitants -0.284 -0.211 -0.582
Railroad accessibility  0.606 0.248 -0.516 
Road accessibility  0.562 0.266 -0.519 
Air accessibility  0.905
Source: elaboration on Eurostat (2011), © ESPON Database (2006), European Commission (2010b) 
 
According to these factor loadings, the following explanation to the extracted principal components 
(PCs) is suggested. PC1, accounting for 21.9% of total variance, is positively linked to the resident 
population, to the share of land used for artificial purposes and to accessibility (mainly air 
accessibility but also rail and railroad accessibility). On the opposite side, negative factor loadings 
for PC1 are observed referring to agricultural GVA and employment (both expressed as % on the 
total). As a consequence, PC1 can be considered an indicator explaining the regional urbanization 
and its accessibility. 
PC2 (15.3% of total variance explained) is positively linked to unemployment rates and to long-
term unemployment rates. A positive relation is also observed referring to the share of population at 
risk of poverty after social transfers. On the contrary, PC2 is negatively related to per capita GDP. 
Due to these reasons, PC2 identifies a weak economic performance and social exclusion. 
PC3 explains 12.2% of total variance. Positive values are associated with employment rates (total, 
female and elder people employment rates). A negative relation is observed between PC3 and the 13 
 
share of less educated people. Therefore, PC3 identifies regions with well-performing labour 
markets. 
PC4 (11.6% of total variance explained) is positively associated to high level of early school leavers 
and to a great share of less-educated people on the total. Therefore, PC4 identifies labour markets 
characterised by a large presence of low-skilled workers. 
PC5 explains 8.2% of the total variance. It is positively related just to two variables: GVA and 
employment in industrial sectors. Therefore, the component highlights the extent of manufacture. 
The last principal component (PC6, which explains 7.3% of the total variance) is positively linked 
to tertiary education, to R&D expenditures and to the percentage of households with broadband 
connection. Therefore, PC6 is a proxy of innovation and investments in human capital. 
According to these results, we can measure regional performances according to the Lisbon 
Strategy’s key dimensions, by assigning to each region a standardized score on each extracted PC
10. 
In figure 4, the results obtained by each region on the 6 PCs are shown: bad performer regions (in 
red colours) are regions which show a value below the average on a given PC; whereas, good 
performer regions (in blue colours) are regions showing values for each PC above the average. 
Referring to PC1 (regional urbanization and accessibility), the highest values are shown by German 
Länder along the river Rhein and by Île de France. In Italy, also Lombardia and Campania show 
high value for this PC. On the opposite, Western French and Spanish regions generally show low 
values for PC1: these results are mainly due to the low accessibility of these regions and to their 
agricultural features.  
Weak economic performance and social exclusion (PC2) particularly affect four groups of regions: i) 
Italian Southern regions; ii) the Länder of the former German Democratic Republic; iii) the 
Southern part of Spain (Andalucia and Extremadura); iv) Nord-Pas-de-Calais, in Northern France, 
which is affected by deindustrialization. The best performer regions according to PC2 are located in 
Northern Italy.  
Moving to the labour market (PC3), Länder in Eastern Germany perform very well, showing the 
highest employment rates within the four countries. Positive values for PC3 are also registered in 
Spanish regions. Instead, in Southern Italy regions are affected by very low employment rates.  
Scores referring to PC4 show the presence of low-skilled workers within the regional labour market. 
Referring to this indicator, Spanish regions (and especially Southern ones) perform very poorly if 
compared to both French and German regions (whose labour markets generally employ high-skilled 







10. In doing so, we use the regression method of Thomson (1951). 14 
 




Source: elaboration on Eurostat (2011), © ESPON Database (2006), European Commission (2010b) 
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PC5 is associated to the presence of manufacture: the most manufacturing regions are Baden-
Württemberg and Saarland in Germany; País Vasco and Navarra in Spain; Northern and Central 
regions in Italy. Instead, regions hosting capital cities are among the least industrialised regions, due 
to the strongest relevance of services in their economy. More in general, other Mediterranean (and 
Southern) regions of Italy, France and Spain are less industrialized regions. 
Lastly, PC6 is associated to the regional investments in human capital and innovation. Italian 
regions (both in the Northern and in the Southern part of the country) perform poorly if compared to 
Spanish and French regions. Also Northern German regions (with the only exceptions of Berlin and 
Bremen) perform below the average. We can conclude that, according to human capital and 
innovation, a sharp distinction between Northern regions and Southern ones does not emerge. 
Deepening the analysis according to the Lisbon Strategy, EU regions show different patterns in 
relation to the different pillars of the Strategy itself: for instance, a good performing labour market, 
high investments in human capital and skills are not always positively linked to the general 
economic performance. This suggests that there is not a unique relationship among the three 
different pillars of the Lisbon Strategy. Some more detailed examples may clarify this issue. Eastern 
German  Länder, in spite of their high employment rates and their high-skilled workers, are 
characterised by low levels of per capita GDP and by high unemployment rates. Rural French 
regions perform generally well according to the Lisbon Strategy, having invested in human capital, 
R&D, broadband connections and so on. However, in spite of the presence of high-skills workers, 
these investments (following Lisbon Strategy’s key targets) have not led employment rates above 
the average.  
Moving to the Mediterranean regions, they perform worst than Continental ones, according to the 
Lisbon Strategy’s targets, thus confirming the findings highlighted by Sapir (2006). However the 
performance of Spanish regions differs from that of Italian ones. Spain has deeply invested in 
innovation and human capital, thus increasing the employment rates (note that we are not 
considering the effects of the current economic crisis). By the way, Southern Spain regions are 
affected both by a weak economic performance (with high unemployment rates) and by a strong 
presence of low-skilled workers. On the other side, Italian regions can be considered amongst the 
worst performing regions according to Lisbon Strategy’s targets. The performance of the labour 
market is particularly poor only in Southern regions, whereas investments in R&D and skills of 
workers are generally low also in Northern richer regions.  
Therefore, if different patterns according to the Lisbon Strategy performance emerge, other 
structural features of the regions may be relevant in order to explain such patterns. In particular, two 
related key-aspects may help in defining them. The first issue is a strong core-periphery model still 
lasting within Europe, in spite of the improvements of territorial EU policies: the historical core of 
Europe (known as Blue-Banana) still shows a better social and economic performance than more 
peripheral regions. A second issue is related to the distribution of manufacturing activities within 
and amongst regions. Although findings are not unique, manufacturing regions tend to employ low-
skilled workers, investing less on human capital and innovation. This relationship is particularly 16 
 
strong within Italian manufacturing regions, even if the economic performance of these regions is 
amongst the best in Europe. If the first issue underlines a clear geographical pattern, the second one 
creates a more complex scheme, according to the distribution of manufacture. 
 
5  The effects of polycentrism on the achievement of the Lisbon Strategy’s main targets 
We have just highlighted the different performances which characterise EU regions according to the 
Lisbon Strategy’s main goals. This section sheds light on the existing relationships between the 
achievement of Lisbon Strategy’s targets and the extent of polycentrism, which could derive by 
territorial policies oriented to a more equilibrated distribution of the economic activities amongst 
regions. In particular, following the literature suggesting the positive effects of polycentrism on 
economic competitiveness and social cohesion (CSD, 1999; Hague et al., 2003; Meijers et al., 
2008), we investigate if the sharp differences emerging by the PCA can be better explained through 
different extents of polycentrism at regional level. By the way, empirical results do not support this 
hypothesis. Indeed, Polycentricity Index estimated on the 10 largest cities per region is not 
significantly correlated to key economic and social variables, such as per capita GDP (r = -0.191), 
unemployment rate (r = -0.021) or total employment rate (r = -0.159). Nor environmental indicators 
(such as the PM10 concentrations and the share of land used for artificial purposes) seem to be 
correlated to the Polycentricity Index
11. 
As we have extracted six PCs from the original set of variables, a more complete analysis can be 
developed by observing the correlations amongst each PC and the Polycentricity Index. Table 3 
shows these correlations: all the policentricity indexes estimated (i.e., based on 5, 8, 10, 12 and 15 
largest cities per region) are reported. 
Referring to PC1, no correlation is observed between polycentrism and regional urbanization and 
accessibility: urban and central regions may be polycentric as well as rural and peripheral ones. 
Furthermore, polycentric regions are not more inclusive than monocentric ones: on the contrary, the 
correlation between PC2 (i.e., “weak economic performance and social exclusion”) and 
Policentricity Index is positive, even though it is not significant. Referring to PC3 (“performance of 
the labour market”), no evidence emerges about a better performance of the labour market within 
polycentric regions. On the opposite side, polycentric regions are more oriented to employ low-
skilled workers: those regions are characterised by higher shares of early school leavers and 
population with a lower education qualification. In particular, correlation between PC4 and 15-cities 
policentricity index is positive and significant. However, it is important to underline that the index 






11. Although, referring to these environmental variables, several outliers may affect our estimations. 17 
 
Table 3 – Correlations amongst extracted PCs and policentricity indexes 
Policentricity 
Index – 5 
cities 
Policentricity 
Index - 8 
cities 
Policentricity 
Index - 10 
cities 
Policentricity 
Index - 12 
Cities 
Policentricity 
Index – 15 
cities 
PC1: urbanization and  
accessibility 
-0.215 -0.160 -0.101 -0.049 0.020 
(0.064)  (0.1695) (0.3893) (0.6745) (0.8664) 
PC2: weak economic performance 
and social exclusion 
0.101 0.086 0.091 0.116 0.142 
(0.3897) (0.4613) (0.4361) (0.3232) (0.2256) 
PC3: performance of labour 
market 
-0.128 -0.109 -0.118 -0.112 -0.090 
(0.2729) (0.3515) (0.3114) (0.3379) (0.4447) 
PC4: low-skilled workers 
0.007 0.091 0.159 0.216 0.265 
(0.9526) (0.4393) (0.1726)  (0.06219)  (0.02151) 
PC5: extent of manufacture  0.409  0.428  0.430  0.436  0.430 
(0.0002743)  (0.000128)  (0.0001197)  (0.00009)  (0.0001184) 
PC6: human capital and innovation 
-0.187  -0.288  -0.351  -0.417  -0.484 
(0.1072)  (0.01219)  (0.00199)  (0.0001955)  (0.00001) 
p-values in parentheses 
Source: elaboration on Insee (1999), Istat (2001), Ine (2001), Destatis (2008) and on Eurostat (2011), © 
ESPON Database (2006), European Commission (2010b) 
 
Similar results emerge by analysing the correlation between PC6 (“human capital and innovation”) 
and 10-cities Policentricity Index: here, correlation is significant and negative. This implies that the 
more polycentric a region is, the less the region invests in human capital and innovation. The 
relation is shown in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5 – Correlation between PC6 and Policentricity Index (10 cities) 
 
Source: elaboration on Insee (1999), Istat (2001), Ine (2001), Destatis (2008) and on Eurostat (2011), © 
ESPON Database (2006), European Commission (2010b) 18 
 
However, an even more significant correlation is that between PC5 (“extent of manufacture”) and 
policentricity index. Polycentric regions show a higher presence of manufacturing activities than 
monocentric ones. The correlation is very significant: it holds whatever estimating policentricity 
index. Therefore, the manufacturing structure of the economy seems to be the most relevant feature 
of polycentric regions (figure 6). 
 
Figure 6 – Correlation between PC5: Manufacturing and Policentricity Index (10 cities) 
 Source: elaboration on Insee (1999), Istat (2001), Ine (2001), Destatis (2008) and on Eurostat (2011), © 
ESPON Database (2006), European Commission (2010b) 
 
Therefore, a strong relationship between manufacturing and polycentrism emerges. In other words, 
the spread of industrial activities can be still considered one of the most important drivers of a 
polycentric regional development. The opposite is also true: monocentric regions, which are 
characterised by largest metropolitan areas (e.g., Île de France, Lazio or Provence-Alpes-Côte 
d'Azur), are more focused on tertiary activities. Therefore, this link between polycentrism and 
manufacturing activities may affect policies’ effectiveness, representing an obstacle to the full 
achievement of Lisbon Strategy’s main targets. In particular, manufacturing activities still affect the 
investments in human capital, especially in some countries, such as Italy. On the other side, less 
industrialized regions (such as the most part of French regions) show better performance in terms of 
investment in R&D and human capital. 
 
6  Conclusions 
Polycentric development plays a key role both on academic debate on regional topics and on EU 
planning policies. Since the presentation of the ESDP, a polycentric regional development has been 
acknowledged as the main tool to foster inclusion, economic competitiveness and environmental 19 
 
sustainability withine European regions (CSD, 1999; Hague et al., 2003; Meijers et al., 2008). Most 
of these targets are now included in the Lisbon Strategy (as well as in Europe 2020 Strategy), even 
if the Strategies do not mainly refer to the regional level.  
In the present paper, we have studied the achievement of the targets related to the Lisbon Strategy 
and we have observed significantly different performances at regional level.  
First of all, a clear core-periphery pattern at EU level still lasts, in spite of the important efforts of 
the EU in improving territorial cohesion (CSD, 1999). Indeed, more ‘central’ regions according to 
population, accessibility and wealth still perform better than peripheral regions when considering 
economic competitiveness and investments in human capital. These findings confirm the 
differences still existing between the Continental social model and Mediterranean one (Sapir, 2006) 
Second, within this EU pattern, differences within each Country are observed when analysing the 
regional performance according to the Lisbon Strategy. These differences are more significant in 
Italy and in Germany, where the contrast between central regions and lagging behind ones has 
stronger historical roots. At the opposite, France seems to be characterised by a more homogeneous 
development pattern amongst its regions. 
Third, when considering regional patterns, manufacture still plays a strategic role in creating new 
emerging differences amongst regions, especially referring to the economic performance: the most 
manufacturing regions are still amongst the richest ones within the continent. However, nowadays 
we observe that in manufacturing regions investment in human capital are not developed with the 
same intensity of past decades. This issue, in perspective, could play a negative role in fostering 
regional growth of these areas.  
Within this framework, the current analysis has also highlighted that polycentrism is positively 
related to manufacturing activity. Moreover, a negative relation between polycentrism and lack of 
investments in human capital is found. Therefore, even though the promotion of a more distributed 
pattern of activities within EU regions fosters the economic growth, two main drawbacks can be 
highlighted within this framework: i) the core-periphery pattern at the EU scale has not yet been 
removed; ii) the polycentric development mainly based on manufacture does not remove new 
emerging divides between innovation poles and manufacturing areas. As a consequence, from this 
analysis we cannot support the hypothesis that a more polycentric development brings more social 





7  Appendix A 
In table A.1, the 25 social, economic and demographic variables which are used for PCA in section 
4.1 are shown. Statistical sources and reference year are also reported.  
 
Table A.1 – Description of variables used for PCA 
Variable Source  Refer.  Year 
Resident Population  Eurostat  2009 
GDP per capita (EU-27 = 100)  Eurostat  2008 
GVA agriculture (% on the total)  Eurostat  2007 
GVA industrial sect. (% on the total)  Eurostat  2007 
Employment in agriculture (% on the total)  Eurostat  2007 
Employment in industrial sect. (% on the total)  Eurostat  2007 
Total employment rate  Eurostat  2008 
Employment rate (55-64 years)  Eurostat  2008 
Female employment rate  Eurostat  2008 
Unemployment rate  Eurostat  2008 
Long-term unemployment rate  Eurostat  2008 
Unemployment rate (15-24 years)  Fifth report on cohesion   2008 
Population at risk of poverty after social transfers (% of total population)  Fifth report on cohesion  2008 
Early school leavers aged 18-24 (in  % on the total of the same years)  Fifth report on cohesion  2007-2009 
Population aged 25-64 with low education (% on the total)  Fifth report on cohesion  2008 
Population aged 30-34 with tertiary education (% on the total)  Fifth report on cohesion  2008 
Expenditure on R&D (% of GDP)  Eurostat  2008 
Patent application to EPO per million inhabitants  Fifth report on cohesion  2006-2007 
Households with broadband connection (% of all households)  Fifth report on cohesion  2009 
Land for artificial uses (% on total)  Eurostat  2009 
Railroad accessibility (average value of Nuts 3)  Espon  2001 
Road accessibility (average value of Nuts 3) Espon  2001 
Air accessibility (Nuts 3 with max accessib.)  Espon  2001 
Passenger cars per 1000 inhabitants  Eurostat  2008 
Yearly average concentration of PM10 (μg/m³) (average value of Nuts-3)  Fifth report on cohesion  2009 
Source: elaboration on Eurostat (2011), © ESPON Database (2006), European Commission (2010b) 
 
In table A.2,  coefficients estimated from equation (1) for the 72 regions are shown. The table 
shows the estimations through OLS method considering the largest 5, 8, 10, 12 and 15 cities within 
each region. By the way, the ‘Policentriciy Index’ most used within the paper is the index that is 









Table A.2 –  coefficients estimated from equation (1) for the 72 regions 
 













Galicia  -0.822 -0.891 -1.006 -1.036 -1.029
Baden-
Württemberg -0.794 -0.817  -0.803  -0.796 -0.784
Asturias  -1.205 -1.284 -1.330 -1.311 -1.242 Bayern  -1.519 -1.256 -1.238 -1.192 -1.127
Cantabria  -1.574 -1.338 -1.212 -1.162 -1.116
Brandenburg 
(incl. Berlin)  -2.447 -1.955  -1.734  -1.569 -1.393
País  Vasco  -0.912 -1.036 -1.027 -1.048 -1.040 Hessen  -1.068 -1.053 -1.035 -1.021 -1.012
Navarra  -1.590 -1.317 -1.238 -1.165 -1.096
Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern -0.836 -0.946  -1.001  -1.047 -1.071
La  Rioja  -1.679 -1.488 -1.444 -1.388 -1.328
Niedersachsen 
(incl. Bremen)  -0.878 -0.874  -0.834  -0.847 -0.847
Aragón  -2.245 -1.691 -1.498 -1.360 -1.266
Nordrhein-
Westfalen -0.386 -0.495  -0.520  -0.537 -0.548
Comunidad de 
Madrid  -1.688 -1.275 -1.215 -1.169 -1.135 Rheinland-Pfalz  -0.477 -0.595 -0.649 -0.670 -0.706
Castilla y León  -0.747  -0.853  -0.902 -0.946 -1.041 Saarland -0.927 -0.758  -0.766 -0.754 -0.721
Castilla-La Mancha  -0.509  -0.614 -0.696 -0.722 -0.757 Sachsen  -1.338 -1.445 -1.374 -1.292 -1.222
Extremadura  -0.932 -0.981 -0.997 -1.011 -1.023 Sachsen-Anhalt  -1.175 -1.096 -1.007 -0.938 -0.853
Cataluña  -1.302 -1.124 -1.038 -0.999 -0.966
Schleswig-
Holstein (incl. 
Hamburg) -1.917 -1.693  -1.641  -1.558 -1.447
Comunidad 
Valenciana  -1.366 -1.318 -1.216 -1.120 -1.040 Thüringen  -0.854 -0.809 -0.775 -0.799 -0.796
Illes Balears  -1.519  -1.117  -0.975  -0.950 -0.910 Île de France  -3.510 -2.454  -2.096  -1.908 -1.726
Andalucía  -0.836 -0.853 -0.872 -0.854 -0.881
Champagne-
Ardenne -1.059 -1.063  -1.111  -1.227 -1.329
Región de Murcia  -1.532  -1.337  -1.245  -1.165 -1.092 Picardie  -0.619 -0.775  -0.830  -0.857 -0.895
Piemonte  -1.638 -1.248 -1.086 -0.967 -0.891
Haute-
Normandie -1.463 -1.404  -1.412  -1.421 -1.431
Valle  d'Aosta  -1.288 -1.028 -0.918 -0.830 -0.754 Centre  -1.014 -0.968 -1.073 -1.174 -1.229
Liguria  -1.658 -1.432 -1.334 -1.298 -1.256
Basse-
Normandie -1.356 -1.204  -1.113  -1.164 -1.159
Lombardia  -1.642 -1.246 -1.090 -0.996 -0.938 Bourgogne  -1.053 -0.828 -0.937 -1.073 -1.173
Provincia Auton. 
Bolzano  -1.246 -1.141 -1.116 -1.085 -1.027
Nord - Pas-de-
Calais -1.009 -1.206  -1.237  -1.264 -1.435
Provincia Auton. 
Trento  -1.291 -1.256 -1.194 -1.121 -1.090 Lorraine  -1.088 -1.290 -1.282 -1.256 -1.213
Veneto  -0.751 -1.022 -1.051 -1.023 -0.976 Alsace  -1.608 -1.572 -1.591 -1.615 -1.599
Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia  -1.308 -1.326 -1.265 -1.184 -1.082 Franche-Comté  -1.032 -1.144 -1.214 -1.228 -1.258
Emilia-Romagna -0.614  -0.508  -0.524  -0.604 -0.743 Pays de la Loire -1.186 -1.292  -1.416 -1.489 -1.476
Toscana  -0.870 -0.758 -0.723 -0.710 -0.716 Bretagne  -0.846 -0.898 -1.029 -1.055 -1.083
Umbria  -0.953 -0.958 -0.952 -0.941 -0.906 Poitou-Charentes -0.648 -0.819 -0.881 -0.932 -1.134
Marche  -0.535 -0.508 -0.486 -0.505 -0.559 Aquitaine  -1.524 -1.333 -1.273 -1.275 -1.394
Lazio  -2.338 -1.654 -1.396 -1.235 -1.105 Midi-Pyrénées  -1.604 -1.440 -1.346 -1.306 -1.276
Abruzzo  -0.625 -0.571 -0.636 -0.649 -0.693 Limousin  -1.824 -1.643 -1.573 -1.484 -1.381
Molise  -1.123 -1.105 -1.044 -0.991 -0.932 Rhône-Alpes  -1.535 -1.322 -1.277 -1.237 -1.176
Campania  -1.529 -1.129 -1.008 -0.918 -0.827 Auvergne  -1.121 -1.124 -1.243 -1.343 -1.360
Puglia  -0.805 -0.751 -0.749 -0.725 -0.686
Languedoc-
Roussillon -0.847 -0.918  -1.030  -1.098 -1.181
Basilicata  -1.089 -0.898 -0.817 -0.765 -0.770
Provence-Alpes-
Côte d'Azur  -1.583 -1.821  -1.792  -1.711 -1.621
Calabria  -0.668 -0.790 -0.823 -0.869 -0.892 Corse  -1.657 -1.516 -1.418 -1.340 -1.228
Sicilia -1.293  -1.216 -1.147 -1.081 -0.993
Sardegna  -0.955 -0.894 -0.848 -0.838 -0.838
Source: personal elaboration on data from: Istat (2001) for Italian comuni; Insee (1999) for French 
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Il policentrismo è un tratto comune dei sistemi urbani Europei. Recentemente, il concetto ha assunto 
una rilevanza normativa, essendo considerato come un pre-requisito fondamentale per uno sviluppo 
più sostenibile e bilanciato all’interno e tra le regioni Europee. Tuttavia, gli effetti del policentrismo 
rispetto ad altre importanti Strategie Europee (come ad esempio la Strategia di Lisbona, indirizzata 
all’incremento della competitività e della coesione sociale in Europa) non sono chiari. Il paper 
mette in evidenza le possibili relazioni tra uno sviluppo policentrico a livello regionale ed il 
raggiungimento degli obiettivi previsti dalla Strategia di Lisbona. Utilizzando un gruppo di 75 
regioni appartenenti a Francia, Germania, Italia e Spagna, abbiamo inizialmente misurato il grado di 
policentrismo di queste regioni, stimando (attraverso la tecnica dei minimi quadrati) la pendenza 
della distribuzione rank-size delle città all’interno di ciascuna regione. In seguito, è stata applicata 
un’analisi in componenti principali, al fine di evidenziare le principali caratteristiche della 
performance di ciascuna regione rispetto agli obiettivi della Strategia di Lisbona. Infine, 
analizzando le correlazioni tra grado di policentrismo e il raggiungimento di tali obiettivi, si è 
osservato come il policentrismo sia significativamente correlato sia alla diffusione dell’attività 
manifatturiera sia a bassi investimenti in innovazione e in capitale umano. 
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